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Resumen
Dado que no existe un consenso teórico acerca del efecto que tienen las devaluaciones sobre el
producto, la evidencia empírica ha jugado un  rol fundamental. Los hallazgos empíricos han
favorecido la visión de que las devaluaciones son contractivas. En el presente trabajo el autor
sugiere que lo que está detrás de estos resultados es un sesgo de selección. En teoría, las mismas
variables que determinan la probabilidad de una devaluación determinan la tasa de crecimiento del
producto. El autor controla por el sesgo de selección utilizando "matching estimators" (estimadores
apariados) y datos para 155 países para el período 1970-1999 que incluyen 264  episodios de
devaluaciones. Al no controlar por sesgo de selección las devaluaciones parecen ser contractivas,
en línea con hallazgos previos de literatura empírica. Sin embargo, cuando el autor controla por el
sesgo de selección el efecto contractivo desaparece. El trabajo incluye un extensivo análisis de
sensibilidad.
Abstract
Given the theoretical disagreement on the effect of a devaluation on output, empirical evidence
plays an fundamental role. Empirical  findings have favored the view that devaluations  are
contractionary. In this paper the author argues that what stands behind these results is selection bias.
In theory, the same variables that determine the probability of a devaluation determine the rate of
growth of output. The author controls for selection bias using matching estimators and extensive
dataset of 155 countries for the period 1970-1999 that includes as  many as 264 devaluation
episodes. Not controlling for selection bias, devaluations appear to be contractionary, in line with
previous findings. Nevertheless, when the author controls for this bias, the contractionary effect
vanishes. Extensive sensitivity analysis is provided.
___________________
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More often than not, theoretical models have ambiguous results on the e®ect of a devaluation
on output. Whether a devaluation is contractionary or expansionary dep ends on the partic-
ular model as well as on the particular parameters of the economy. On the other hand, the
experience of a number of countries seems to validate the view that devalautions are rather
contractionary. During the 1990's Mexico, Indonesia, Malaysia, South Korea, the Philippines,
Thailand, Russia, and Turkey and more recently Argentina experienced a dramatic devalua-
tion of the local currency accompanied by recession rather than recovery. In the present paper
I put this view to test.
According to traditional textbook theories, devaluations should have an expansionary e®ect
on the economy. The devaluation is supposed to have a switching e®ect, increasing the pro-
duction of tradables and improving the external position of the country. Nevertheless, there
is growing literature claiming that devaluations are likely to be contractionary rather than
expansionary1. Given the theoretical disagreement, empirical evidence plays an important
role. Possibly the earliest paper to study the issue from an empirical perspective is Cooper
[1971b] that ¯nds devaluations to be \often" contractionary. Since then, a number of stud-
ies have found similar evidence using sophisticated econometric techniques and an increasing
number of cross-country observations, while other papers have found the contrary to be true.
The empirical literature so far has overlooked an important factor: countries that expe-
rience a sharp devaluation are not randomly chosen among all countries. It is plausible that
the same variables that a®ect the likelyhood of a devaluation also determine output growth.
This is known in labor literature as \selection bias". Traditional econometric methods are
unable to properly account for this problem, and so produce biased estimates. The purpose
of the present paper is to provide robust and unbiased evidence on whether devaluations are
contractionary in the short run.
In the present paper, I further investigate the short run e®ects of devaluations on growth.
In particular, and following the seminal paper by Cooper [1971b] I focus on episodes of \sud-
den" discrete devaluations2. The main reason given by Cooper [1971, p.1] to focus on this
type of events is \because of the associated trauma, which arises because so many economic
adjustments to a discrete change in the exchange rate are crowded into a relatively short
period".
In comparison to the rest of the literature on the issue, this paper uses the largest data
set, with the largest number of countries, observations and devaluation episodes. Moreover, in
1order to tackle the problem of selection bias, the present study is the ¯rst to apply matching
estimators to the question at hand. Matching is a non-parametric technique widely used in
labor economics to evaluate the e®ect of training and other programs on income. In general, the
idea is to compare episodes of large-devaluation with countries that are as similar as possible
but that did not devalue. This is a way to mimic or replicate a natural experiment setting.
In this paper, estimates of the e®ect of sharp devaluations that do not control for selection
bias show that these events are associated with considerable lower growth rates. This is in line
with previous ¯ndings using unconditional comparisons and regression analyses. Nevertheless,
after taking into account the fact that variables that induce a sharp devaluation may also
a®ect growth, sharp devaluations appear not to have any signi¯cant e®ect on output growth.
This result is robust to the de¯nition of sharp devaluation as well as to the variables that are
used as control variables. I conjecture that the di®erent channels through which devaluations
are supposed to a®ect growth cancel each other.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the main theoret-
ical arguments on how a devalaution a®ects output. Based on the existing theoretical work I
argue that not accounting for selection bias is the main de¯ciency of previous empirical stud-
ies. Section three reviews previous empirical work. I put particular emphasis on the more
sophisticated and in°uential part of this extensive literature. I show that, even though results
point in every direction, i.e. that devaluations are contractionary, expansionary or neutral,
there is growing support for the view that devaluations are rather contractionary. Section
four outlines the empirical approach. In order to tackle the problem of selection bias, I use
matching estimators. Matching estimators are explained in detail in that section. Section ¯ve
concentrates on the results and provides sensitivity analyses, particularly on the methodology
as well as on the de¯nition of devaluation. I show that indeed selection bias is what stands
behind the fact that the empirical literature so far tends to favor the view that devaluations are
contractionary. After controlling for selection bias, the contractionary e®ect of devaluations
tends to vanish. Section six concludes.
II Devaluation, Growth and Selection Bias: An An-
alytical Framework
If there is one thing that characterizes the theories on the shoet run e®ect of devaluation on
growth is that almost always the sign of this e®ect is theoretically ambiguous. Even though
more traditional views supported the idea that devaluations are expansionary, this argument
2not only has been apparently rejected by the data, but has also been theoretically challenged
in many ways. Most of the challenging arguments have been ¯nely summarized and analyzed
by Edwards [1989] as well as by Lizondo and Montiel [1989]. The more typical arguments on
the e®ects of a devaluation on output are:
² According to the traditional view (Dornbusch [1988]), if there is iddle capacity, for a
given level of real income, a devaluation will shift demand towards the non-tradable
sector, stimulating growth. This is consistent with the view that the total (domestic and
foreign) demand for domestically-produced tradable goods is perfectly elastic and not
a®ected by relative price changes.
² A real devaluation a®ects both real income and the demand for domestically produced
goods. If the share of tradable goods in total output is higher (lower) than the share
of tradable goods in consumption, then the e®ect is expansionary (contractionary). The
real devaluation increases the real value of the tradable output but also increases the
real cost of consumption of tredables. The net e®ect on income will depend on which is
higher: the share of tradable goods in consumption or in income.
² A real devaluation has redistributing e®ects. This resdistribution of income can be be-
tween wages and pro¯ts (see Diaz Alejandro [1963], Cooper [1971a, 1971b] and Krugman
and Taylor [1978]) or between factors in the tradable and non-tradable sectors. Depend-
ing on the speci¯c model's assumptions and particularly on the assumed di®erences in
the marginal propensity to consume, the devaluation can increase or decrease demand
for domestically-produced output.
² A devaluation is likeley to have a negative e®ect through the real cash balance. A
devaluation is likely to increase the price level and thereby to reduce the real stock of
money. As individuals try to restore the real value of their stock of money, they consume
less (see Gylfson and Schmid [1983], Gylfason and Radetzki [1985] and Edwards [1989]).
Montiel and Lizondo [1989] argue that this e®ect can be reverted if individuals hold other
types of assets whose nominal value increase with a devaluation, e.g. foreign currency.
² A devaluation rises the domestic price of imported inputs, having a negative e®ect on
aggregate supply. Models including this e®ect are Gyfalson and Schmid [1983], van
Wijnbergen [1986] and Edwards [1989].
² A devaluation rises the real value of the foreign debt service, reducing national income.
This contractionary e®ect has been emphasized by Gylfason and Risager [1984] and
Edwards [1989].
3A more recent line of thought puts the emphasis on the risk premium (see for example
Krugman [1999]). This view is ¯nely summarized in a model presented by C¶ espedes et al.
[2000], to which I will refer as the CCV thereafter. This is a dynamic general equilibrium
open-economy model where (C¶ espedes et al., 2000 p.2): \the real exchange rate plays a central
role in the adjustment process, wages are sticky in terms of a domestic currency [...], liabilities
are \dollarized", and the country-risk premium is endogenously determined by the net worth
of domestic entrepreneurs." The authors use this model to investigate the insulating properties
of di®erent exchange rate regimes. Nevertheless, the model has important implications for the
e®ects of a devaluation on output. The CCV model clearly shows that the relevant comparison
is not between an episode of nominal devaluation and an episode of stable nominal exchange
rate in general. When an adverse shock calls for a real depreciation, the relevant comparison
is between letting the nominal exchange rate depreciate or some alternative policy, e.g. having
de°ation. Even though the devaluation might be partially responsible for a fall in output, to
avoid the devaluation (and allow for de°ation) might have even worse consequences. Regarding
the e®ect of a devaluation on output, the main lessons from the CCV model are:
² An adverse shock such as an increase in the world interest rate a®ects output negatively
and also calls for a real devaluation. This is also recognized by Kamin and Klau [1997].
This means that even though we might see a fall in output and a nominal devaluation
occuring at the same time, that does not necessarily imply that the devaluation caused
the fall in output. A devaluation can be neither expansionary nor contractionary and we
can still observe a negative correlation between these two variables.
² If a necessary real devaluation is achieved through de°ation rather than through a nom-
inal devaluation and wages are sticky there would be a temporary increase in real wages
with an adverse e®ect on output. In that sense, the nominal devaluation is actually
expansionary when compared to the alternative scenario. The devaluation isolates the
labor markets from the external shock.
² A nominal devaluation has a negative e®ect on net worth since debt is denominated in
dollars. Nevertheless, according to the CCV model, if the needed real depreciation is
achieved through de°ation, the e®ect on net worth is even more negative. The initial
de°ation depreciates the real exchange rate by less, and thus has a smaller negative e®ect
on net worth. But there is a fall in output (as explained above) that, as C¶ espedes et.
al [2000] show, more than compensates for this di®erence. The total e®ect is always less
negative with a devaluation of the nominal exchange rate.
4² Following Bernanke et al. [1998], in the CCV model the risk premium depends on the
ratio of investment to ¯rms' net worth. Compared to de°ation, a devaluation implies
both higher net worth and higher domestic value of investment. The net e®ect could go
either way.
The CCV model also shows that the magnitude of the e®ects of a nominal devaluation or
de°ation depend crucially on the parameters of the economy. Of particular interest is the
¯nancial vulnerability of the economy. Finanacial vulnerability acts as a multiplier through
the risk premium. In the CCV model, ¯nancial vulnerability is measured through the elasticity
of the risk premium with respect to a change in the real exchange rate. This in turn depends on
the share of investment demand in total non-consumption demand for home goods, the steady
state ratio of debt to net worth, the elasticity of the risk premium function, and monitoring
costs in the ¯nancial markets. The more vulnerable the economy is, the stronger the e®ect of
real devaluation will be on output. In addition, all e®ects are non-linear. C¶ espedes et al. [2000]
solve a linearized version of the model. As we deviate from the steady state non-linearities
become more and more important. The non-linearities in the CCV model come mostly from
information asymmetries in the ¯nancial markets. Finally, given the non-linearities of the
CCV model, large devaluations may have e®ects that are very di®erent in magnitude from
small devaluations. Krugman [1999] argues that balance sheet e®ects may dominate only for
large devaluations.
The implications of the theoretical literature for the appropriate empirical approach are
not trivial. First, given the theoretical disagreement on the net e®ect of a devaluation on
output, the empirical literature plays an important role. Second, when one asseses the e®ect
of devaluation on output one has to take into account that the same variables that a®ect
output might also a®ect the exchange rate. One has to control for the relevant variables
that are correlated both with output and the exchange rate. These control variables have
to include not only the relevant shocks but also other characteristics of the economy that
determine how important the e®ects are, such as ¯nancial vulnerability. Third, one has to
compare similar economies. The relevant question is what would happen to the output of a
country that experiences a nominal devaluation compared to the same country under the same
circumstances had it not devalued. In other words, one has to avoid selection bias in the sense
of comparing a country that went through a sharp devaluation with another that never needed
such a devaluation in the ¯rst place, either because it did not face similar shocks or because
it is less vulnerable. Most of the arguments above point in the direction that economies with
di®erent structures are likely to respond di®erently to a nominal devaluation. This is a central
5point and a serious complication that no empirical work on the issue has tackled so far. An
important contribution of the present paper is to control for selection bias. Fourth, the non-
linear aspect of the problem at hand must be taken into account. To impose a linear structure
may be an inadequate way to proceed. Instead, it seems better to use techniques that are more
robust to the speci¯cation of the problem. Finally, it seems reasonable and even desirable to
concentrate on some non-linear measure of devaluations.
III Previous Findings
Possibly the earliest study on the e®ect of devaluation on economic performance is Cooper
[1971b]. That paper studies 24 cases of \large" devaluations in LDCs during the period 1953-
66 and ¯nds devaluations to be \often" contractionary. In response, Krueger [1978] analyzed
output behavior for 22 cases of \large" devaluation in LDC for the period 1951-70 rejecting
for most of the cases the hypothesis that devaluations are contractionary.
Since this early discussion a few papers have found devaluations to be expansionary. Some
of them, such as Gylfason and Schmidt [1983], Gylfason and Risager [1984] and Gylfason and
Radetzky [1985], have been based on the simulation of small macro models that incorporate
elements such as intermediate inputs or debt service. Nevertheless, most of the empirical
evidence that favors the view that devaluations are expansionary comes from studies that use
VAR techniques. Almost all of these studies, ¯nely summarized in Kamin and Klau [1997], are
not focused directly on the e®ects of exchange rates on output per se and analyze the experience
of a single country. Also Kamin and Klau [1997] provide time series evidence that for 27
countries and the period 1970-1996 real exchange rate devaluations are expansionary (although
the results are shown not to be robust by the same authors). Other (rather simple) empirical
studies have found mixed evidence, ¯nding either di®erent results for di®erent countries, or
no statistically signi¯cant e®ects (Connolly [1983], Upadhyaya [1999] and Upadhyaya and
Upadhyaya [1999]).
However, the most sophisticated piece of econometric work, and the most in°uential, have
found devaluations to be contractionary. The ¯rst extensive regression analysis that explicitly
takes into account the e®ect of other variables is Edwards [1986]. The study looks at the
e®ect of changes in the real exchange rate on output, but controls for the e®ect on output of
government spending, monetary shocks, the terms of trade and a country speci¯c time trend.
It uses data for 12 developing countries for 1965-80. The author concludes that depreciations
of the real exchange rate have a contemporaneous negative e®ect on real output, but this e®ect
6is reverted after one year.
In a follow-up study, Edwards [1989] extends the analysis of Edwards [1986] to include
more detailed analysis of the data, more countries, a longer coverage period, and basically the
same theoretical framework (made explicit through a model) and regression techniques. In this
paper the author contrasts the growth rate of 39 devaluation episodes for the period 1962-82
with a control group consisting of 24 developing nations that maintained a ¯xed exchange
rate for at least ten years. This comparison shows that the average growth rate of the large-
devaluation years is about 2 percentage points lower than that of the control group. The
regression analysis, performed for 12 developing countries for the period 1965-84 con¯rms the
above results, showing a short run negative e®ect of devaluations3.
Morley [1992] studies 28 large-devaluation cases covering 26 countries and the period 1973-
83. This study focuses on the e®ect of real devaluations on capacity utilization and uses a
pooled regression, with no ¯xed or random e®ects, except for a dummy for African countries.
The regression controls for standard variables such as monetary and ¯scal policy and terms of
trade, but also controls for some less standard variables such as the rate of growth of exports
and imports. The regression yields a coe±cient for the real exchange rate that is negative
and signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. In a more sophisticated econometric work, Kamin and
Klau [1997] run a ¯xed e®ects error-correction model for 27 countries for the period 1970-1996.
They control for monetary, ¯scal and external variables as well as for the investment ratio.
Also according to this speci¯cation real devaluations appear to be contractionary in the short
run.
Barro [2001] also focuses on ¯ve countries that experienced a large devaluation during the
¯nancial crisis of 1997-98. He contrasts the performance of those countries to the performance
of other four Asian countries that did not experience a large devaluation during the same
period. The author runs a pooled regression for 67 countries for the averages of each ¯ve years
from 1965-2000. No random or ¯xed e®ects are included. In other words, this is a cross section
where the units of observation are the pairs country-quinquennium. The control variables are
initial per capita GDP, male upper-level schooling, life expectancy, fertility rate, government
consumption, a rule-of-law index, a measure of openness, the in°ation rate, the investment ratio
and the growth rate of the terms of trade. Dummies for the two groups of Asian countries
are added to this basic regression. The results show that countries that experienced a large-
devaluation grew about four percentage points less than otherwise predicted, while the other
four countries grew in a way that is not signi¯cantly di®erent from predicted. Unfortunately,
the use of ¯ve-year averages does not allow us to know if the lower growth happened before,
7during or after the crisis.
IV Empirical Approach: Matching Estimators
As the above analysis shows, a problem with erxisitng empirical studies is that they do not
consider that devaluations are not the result of a random experiment. Consequently, the
estimated mean di®erences across devaluations and normal periods are likely to be a biased
estimator of the \true" di®erence. The same covariates that a®ect economic performance may
induce the devaluation, possibly in a non-liner fashion. For example, if countries are more likely
to devalue and to grow less when faced with negative terms of trade shocks, the parameter that
captures the e®ect of a devaluation will be correlated with the omitted variables producing a
downward bias on the estimated e®ect of the devaluation. Similarly, as the CCV model shows,
countries that are ¯nancially more vulnerable are likely to grow less because of a higher risk
premium and lower investment and at the same time are more likely to experience a sharp
devaluation when phased with a negative external shock.
One way to avoid these problems is to calibrate and simulate a structural model. This is
done by C¶ espedes et. al [2000], Gylfason and Schmidt [1983] and Gylfason and Risager [1984],
among others. In contrast, I will follow an econometric approach in order to estimate the mean
(and median) e®ect of devaluations on output as implied by historical data.
In order to avoid the selection bias, it is necessary to de¯ne how the nominal exchange
rate reacts to the relevant variables, given that we want to compare countries under similar
circumstances. One way to proceed would be to have a complete econometric model of the
nominal exchange rate. This is a very di±cult task in face of the particularities of each country
and the non-linearities inherent to the problem. Also, the magnitudes are not necessarily
comparable across countries. What can be a very dramatic devaluation for one country can
be a very common event for another. An alternative is to concentrate on events of sharp
devaluations or exchange rate crises. It is a very common practice in international ¯nance
to concentrate on crises rather than on the magnitude of the crises4. This is obviously a
consequence of the di±culty of the problem at hand.
Call g0
it the growth rate of country i in period t if it does not devalue. Similarly, call g1
it the
growth rate of country i in period t if it does devalue. De¯ne a set of variables T that a®ect
the growth rate, such that:
g0
it = h0(Tit) + U0
it (1)
g1
it = h1(Tit) + U1
it;
8where U are additively separable unobservable variables. So far, researchers have assumed that
devaluation is a random event, sometimes controlling for T in a linear fashion. This allows
to compare directly the outcomes of countries that have devalued and countries that have not




1 if Ã(Z) ¡ v ¸ 0
0 otherwise,
(2)
where Z may or may not contain some or all the variables in T. The parameter of interest is
¹ = E(g0
it¡g1
itjZ;T;D = 1). In words, we are interested in the mean e®ect of a sharp devalua-
tion on a country's economic growth. The analyst's problem, however, is that he does not have
data to estimate E(g0
itjZ;T;D = 1), the growth rate of countries that devalued, had they not
devalued. An appropriate control group will allow us to compare observations with identical
covariates. Unfortunately, we have no such control group. I address the problem using match-
ing estimators, developed in training evaluation labor literature5. Matching estimators use
the existing data to construct an appropriate sample counterpart for the missing information.
I follow this non-parametric approach because: a) it generates an adequate control group on
which to perform the comparison of outcomes. This is done by pairing each large-devaluation
episode with \similar" episodes from the control group. b) It is a general method in the sense
that no particular speci¯cation of the underlying model has to be assumed. These two points
are relevant to the problem at hand, as explained in the previous section.
The basic assumption of matching estimators is that the selection of the treated is based
on observable (to the researcher) variables. In particular it assumes that the outcomes of the
un-treated are independent of the participation variable once one controls for the observables:
y0?DjX, where X contains the variables in Z and T. In terms of the problem at hand, the
devaluation event is totally determined by Z and a random factor. This implies that after
controlling for Z, the outcomes of the un-treated (no large-devaluation) is exactly what the
outcome of the treated (large-devaluation) would have been without the treatment. The fact
that some of these identical country-periods (in terms of Z) had a large-devaluation and others
did not is assumed to be a random event.
If the sample is large enough, we might ¯nd for each treated observation at least one
un-treated observation with the same characteristics, and this would constitute the required
counterfactual. In order to guarantee that all treated agents have such a counterpart in the
population (not necessarily in the sample) we also need to assume that 0 < Pr(D = 1jZ) < 1.
9The problem is that in most samples it is not possible to ¯nd an exact match. The matching
method focuses on estimating an average version of the parameter of interest. This average
version is given by:
M(S) =
R
S E(y1 ¡ y0jX;D = 1)dF(XjD = 1)
R
S F(XjD = 1)
; (3)
where S is a subset of the support of X given D = 1, and X contains all the variables in T
and Z. I estimate the di®erence in outcome as an average of the di®erences with respect to









where ^ M stands for the matching estimator, T and C are respectively the sets of treated and
untreated periods, Wij are weights attached to each untreated observation j for comparison
with treated country i, and wi are the weights that allow us to reconstruct the outcome
distribution for the treated sample. In order to check the robustness of the results I follow
di®erent approaches to calculate this average. The di®erent methods di®er on the de¯nition
of Wij, that is, on the weights assigned to each untreated observation.
The matching method requires that we compare the characteristics of di®erent countries.
This can be an extremely painful, time consuming and even impossible high-dimensionality
problem. Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] show that a simplifying way to perform this com-
parison is to use the propensity score. The propensity score is de¯ned as the probability of
participation: P(Z) = Pr(D = 1jZ). In our case, this is the probability of a large-devaluation.
This reduces a multi-dimensional problem to a one-dimensional problem, provided that we can
estimate P(Z). Instead of matching countries directly on their characteristics, we can compare
countries with similar probability of experiencing a large-devaluation.
I use a simple average nearest neighbor estimator. For each treated observation I select
among the untreated observations a pre-determined number of nearest neighbor(s). The near-
est neighbors of a particular treated observation i are de¯ned as those untreated observations
that have the smallest di®erence in propensity score with respect to i. This method attaches
the simple average of the outcomes of the nearest neighbors as the relevant comparison obser-
vation. If we choose to have nn nearest neighbors, we set for the nn nearest neighbors (closer
propensity) Wij = 1 and Wij = 0 otherwise, and to set wi = 1
nn.
The above method can be applied by varying the number of nearest neighbors. Also it
can be performed with and without replacement. In the former case the same untreated
10observation can be the nearest neighbor of several treated observations. In the latter, each
untreated observation can be the nearest neighbor of only one treated observation. This last
option demands more data points and increases the likelihood of including observations that
are too distant, but reduces the risk of relying on too few comparison observations.
V Results
Large Devaluations: A De¯nition
As stated above, the present study concentrates on the e®ect of sharp devaluations on growth.
I de¯ne sharp devaluations as exchange rate increases that are big from a country`s historical
perspective. Devaluation episodes are calculated from monthly data on the exchange rate of
155 non OECD countries including Korea and Mexico and for the period ranging from 1970
to 1999. Following Levy-Yeyati and Sturtzeneger [2002] for each country I use the exchange
rate with respect to \the most relevant" country6. For example, the reference exchange rate
for Poland is the zlotych-mark exchange rate, but for Chad (and a number of other African
countries) it is the exchange rate with respect to the French franc. Exchange rates with respect
to the US are obtained from the IFS CD-ROM provided by the IMF and are used to construct
the other bilateral exchange rates when needed. Not all countries have information for all
years. There is an average of about 27 years of data per country. The exclusion of OECD
countries is common practice in crises literature, somewhat arbitrary, but a safe measure to
avoid including countries that are too di®erent at least in the sense that those are mostly net
creditor countries.
A high devaluation is de¯ned as an episode in which the monthly exchange rate devaluation
deviates from the country`s average rate of devaluation over all available months by more than
2.5 times the standard deviation:
D =
½
1 if "i;t ¸ ¹ "i + 2:5 ¤ ¾i(") and "i;t ¸ 5%
0 otherwise,
(5)
where "i;t is the rate of devaluation of the currency of country i in month t (using end of
month exchange rates), ¹ "i is the average rate of devaluation for country i over all the available
months and ¾i(") is the standard deviation of the rate of devaluation for country i over all
the available months. I also restrict the de¯nition to contain only episodes in which the rate
of devaluation is more than 5%. This is not to include small devaluations from countries that
11experience very low exchange rate °uctuations. A very similar approach is used by Hutchison
[2001].
It is also necessary to take into account very high in°ation episodes. As posed by Kaminsky
and Reinhart [1999]: \A single index for the countries that had hyperin°ation episodes would
miss sizable devaluations [...] in the moderate in°ation periods, since the historic mean is
distorted by the high-in°ation episode." In order to avoid this problem I follow Kaminsky and
Reinhart [1999] and treat as a separate unit (a separate country) a period of in°ation higher
than 100%, including a window of six month before and after.
Thresholds have been used to de¯ne crisis by an increasing number of studies (Eichengreen
et al. [1996], Sachs et al. [1996] and Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999]), but most authors include
the variation of reserves (and of interest rates when available) in their de¯nitions, in order to
capture events where the currency has been under attack, but no devaluation took place. The
object of interest in the present paper are nominal devaluations, so I do not include variations
in reserves. From the monthly data I obtain 885 episodes that satisfy the above criteria. The
average monthly devaluation rate during these episodes is 95%, with a minimum of 5% (by
de¯nition), a maximum of 14,186% and a median of 17%.
For all statistical calculations I use yearly rather than monthly data. A year is said to
be a high devaluation year if there is one or more high devaluation months within the year.
If there two or more consecutive high-devaluation years, I consider only the ¯rst of them. In
addition, a window of two years after each devaluation episode (for the country that exhibits the
devaluation) is excluded from the sample. This is not to include into the control group or the
treated group observations that might be contaminated by the e®ects of recent devaluations.
The resulting large devaluation episodes are listed in Table I, where I include only those
observations that have data for per capita GDP growth. There are 264 devaluation episodes
left. Some countries, such as Botswana, Burundi, Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago,
and Turkey have had as many as ¯ve devaluation episodes in the period under analysis. The
1990s is the decade with the largest number of episodes (125) and 1994 the year with the
largest number of episodes (27).
Unconditional Comparison and Linear Regression: A Bench-
mark
As a ¯rst approach, I compare the growth rates of large-devaluation periods with the rate
of growth of \normal" periods for all country-years. The results are presented in Table II.
Periods classi¯ed as \devaluers" exhibit a considerably lower growth rate than do control
12periods. The mean di®erence in annual growth rate is as much as 2.1 percentage points in
favor of the control group. The median di®erence is -1.5. Latin America and the Caribean
is the region of the world7 with the largest di®erence between devaluers and non-devaluers.
The mean di®erence in annual per capita growth rate goes to 4.2 percentage points in favor of
non-devaluers. Nevertheless, this region does not account for the whole story and without it
there is a statistically signi¯cative di®erence in per capita growth of 1.4 percentage points. In
addition, Table II shows that the 1990's are not di®erent. Even though average growth rates
are lower for both groups, the mean di®erence does not change substantially with respect to
the whole sample. The median di®erence is about one percentage point more negative.
The above results are in line with previous ¯ndings. For example, Edwards [1989] ¯nds
that the median growth rate at the year of the devaluation is 2.2 percentage points lower than
that of the control group. A similar magnitude is provided by Barro [2001].
Of course, unconditional comparison of growth rates is likely to be a biased estimate of the
true e®ect. Most studies use regression techniques to control for variables that might a®ect
GDP growth and bias the e®ect of the devaluation dummy. Table III presents results using
regression analysis. The dependent variable is the logarithmic change in annual per capita
GDP8. To evaluate the robustness of the results I ¯t six di®erent models. I assume that
\potential" per capita output (^ y) is determined by per capita capital stock (K) and a Solow
residual (A). On the other hand, current per capita growth rate (g) is determined by the
growth rate of per capita potential output (^ g), a convergence factor that brings actual GDP
towards potential GDP (y ¡ ^ y) and a number of domestic as well as external shocks. For a
country i in a particular period t:
^ yit = Ait ¤ F(Kit) (6)
git = ^ git + µ(yit ¡ ^ yit) + shocksit + ´i + "; (7)
where ´i is country speci¯c random e®ect and " is a normally distributed zero mean residual.
The choice of variables to explain potential GDP growth comes from the growth literature9. I
also control for variables that approximate the relevant shocks. The source and construction
of all variables are described in detail in the Appendix. The devaluation dummy variable is
also included.
The ¯rst equation excludes less traditional (to the empirical growth literature) variables
such as the output gap, monetary shocks and a proxy for ¯nancial system fragility. It does
include a measure of initial per capita GDP to capture the familiar conditional convergence
13e®ect. Also included are two measures of human capital, namely average years of school
attainment and life expectancy at birth. There are also four variables that capture some
aspects of government policies and institutions: a measure of government size, a measure of
macroeconomic stability (in°ation), a measure of distortions in the exchange rate market,
and a measure of openness to international trade. The next three variables are dummies that
capture some other relevant aspects of a country, such as having a civil war during a particular
year, being a tropical country and being an exporter of non fuel primary products. Finally,
two variables capture external conditions: the growth rate of industrialized countries and the
growth rate of the terms of trade.
In addition to the variables in the ¯rst equation, I have three variables less traditional
in empirical growth literature included in the second equation. First, the output gap to
capture some \out of equilibrium" dynamics. Second, and following Edwards [1989], I include
a measure of monetary shocks. Third, and following Beck et al. [1999] I include a measure of
¯nancial development. In the third equation I included regional dummies, while in the fourth
equation I included a dummy for each year. The ¯fth equation looks only at Latin American
countries while the last equation looks at all countries but only for the 1990's. The number
of observations varies depending on data availability, with a maximum of 1,269 observations
coming from 91 countries. The parameters are estimated using Maximum Likelihood and a
Gauss-Hermite quadrature approximation.
It is worth noting that education, measured by average years of schooling, does not seem
to have any e®ect on output growth, except for equation four, where the coe±cient is only
marginally signi¯cant at the 5% level10. The same is true for the growth rate of industrialized
countries, for which the parameter is not only non-signi¯cant but it even changes sign from
one equation to another. Also the openness proxy does not show a signi¯cant e®ect on output
growth, except for the Latin American countries, where it is negatively correlated with growth.
Finally, it is interesting to point out that terms of trade looses its ability to explain growth
when controlling for monetary shocks.
With respect to the variable of interest, i.e. the devaluation dummy, the GLS random-
e®ects estimation results show that a devaluation reduces growth by 1.6 to 2.3 percentage
points. The e®ect is the strongest for Latin American countries, with a contractionary e®ect
of 3.1 percentage points of annual per capita GDP growth. Nevertheless, the results are not
totally driven by Latin American countries. With Latin America excluded, the contractionary
e®ect reported here is still positive and strongly signi¯cant. These results are similar to those
obtained from the unconditional comparison. The results are also similar to what other authors
14have obtained. In particular, Barro [2001] ¯nds that the currency crises experienced by ¯ve
Asian countries during the period 1997-1998 is associated with a per capita growth rate that
is on average 1.3 percentage points lower than otherwise predicted. Hutchinson [2001] ¯nds
balance of payment crises to reduce output growth by 1.5 percentage points, but that study
includes reserve losses as part of the crisis indicator.
Matching Estimators
The ¯rst of the matching method is to de¯ne the propensity score. The propensity score
corresponds to the ¯tted probability of devaluation, were all variables a®ecting the dependent
variable (growth) as well as the probability of a high-devaluation should be included11. All
estimations presented below were performed by ¯tting a random e®ects probit model.
In order to check the robustness of the results, I ¯tted four di®erent speci¯cations for
the probability of currency crisis; the results are reported in Table V. The reported equations
were obtained after some speci¯cation search where other variables such as government surplus,
current account de¯cit, and past exchange rate regime were discarded12. Details about the
source and construction of each series are shown in the Appendix. The ¯rst model (column 1)
includes variables that are traditionally associated with the probability of an exchange crisis13.
The ¯rst three variables capture the ¯nancial vulnerability of the country. First, the (lag of
the) rate of growth of exports. Second, the (lag of the) ratio of external debt to annual exports.
Third, a measure of the ratio of external debt to GDP relative to \normal" or usual values.
Some measure of the level of reserves is normally included in other studies. Nevertheless,
variations of that variable were not signi¯cant and, in the process of speci¯cation search, it
was left out. Two variables capture the e®ects of the real exchange rate on the probability of
a nominal devaluation. The ¯rst looks at the contemporaneous level of the real exchange rate,
where higher values are expected to be accompanied by nominal devaluations. The second,
following Goldfajn and Vald¶ es [1997], captures (lagged) real exchange rate misalignments.
Similarly, the black market premium is there to capture distortions in the exchange rate
markets that might call for a nominal devaluation (see Edwards, 1989). Also included are two
measures of how open is the country to international trade. The ¯rst captures actual openness,
while the second captures trend openness, smoothing out extraordinary open or closed periods.
Finally, there are two variables to capture the importance of regional conditions: following
Edwards [2001] I include the number of crises in the region during the same period14, and the
total capital °ows to the region as a fraction of the region's GDP.
Equation 2 includes all the variables in equation 1 and the lag of the output gap. This
15variable is included to capture factor utilization in the economy, where a larger output gap is
supposed to be related to larger unemployment rates, possibly increasing the probability of a
devaluation. Equation 4 includes regional dummies, while equation 5 includes yearly dummies.
The results of Table V show that for the variables included in the ¯rst equation the para-
meters have the expected sign and are relatively robust to the di®erent speci¯cations. Some
of the results are interesting by themselves. Both the level of the real exchange rate and (the
lag of) the measure of real exchange rate overvaluation are positive and signi¯cant in explain-
ing the probability of a large devaluation. As expected, when a currency is overvalued it is
more likely that the nominal exchange rate will su®er a devaluation. But, also the level of
the real exchange rate matters. Based on the CCV model presented above, the (equilibrium)
real exchange rate changes in response to foreign and domestic shocks. An increase in the real
exchange rate is associated with a larger probability of devaluation as the alternative policy is
to allow for wage de°ation.
It is also interesting to notice that while openness is positively associated with the proba-
bility of devaluation, the smoothed version of the variable has a negative parameter but similar
in absolute value. This means that the probability of a large devaluation increases when the
country is \more open than usual". This is consistent with the idea that during international
liberalization periods, countries are more exposed to balance of payments problems15. Addi-
tionally, while the debt to exports ratio is marginally signi¯cant in two of the ¯ve equations,
debt to GDP above the historical trend has a positive and signi¯cant parameter. This is a
measure of ¯nancial vulnerability (recall the importance of this variable in the CCV model)
and controls for an \excessive debt e®ect". The smoothed version of the variable proxies the
\normal" or \acceptable" level of indebtedness, while deviations from this trend (from above)
measures \over-indebtedness" with the associated increase in the risk premium.
Two additional variables have been included in the analysis in order to capture regional
¯nancial conditions. First is a variable containing the number of large devaluations detected
on other countries of the same region during the same year. This is to capture regional
contagion16, and the parameter is positive and signi¯cant. The second is total capital °ows to
the region as a percentage of the region's GDP. Changes in both these variables are measures
of external shocks that demand internal adjustments to the real exchange rate.
The purpose of matching estimators is to compare similar countries to avoid selection bias.
The propensity scores calculated above (the ¯tted probabilities) do a good job in bringing the
samples closer together. For example, exports growth rate for devaluers is on average 2.81%,
which contrasts with a 10.81% average for the rest of the observations. If we take the average
16of the control observations derived from the nearest neighbor without replacement using the
propensity score implied by equation 317 the average growth rate of exports is reduced to
3.4%18. Similarly, the average number of crisis in the region during a particular year goes
up from 4.4 for all non-devaluer observations, to 6.1 for matching observations, which is the
same as the average of devaluers. Also, I report in Table IV the nearest neighbor implied by
equation three in Table V for each treated observation, with and without replacement. For
some observations, the nearest neighbor seems reasonable at ¯rst sight. Nevertheless, for other
observations the nearest neighbor might look a little awkward. In order to be more robust to
the choice of neighbors I perform also matching using the ¯ve nearest neighbors with an equal
weight each.
Results for the matching estimates are reported in Table VI. Each column corresponds to
the respective equation of Table V, where the ¯tted probabilities were used as the propensity
score to perform the matching. For each equation I calculated the mean and median di®erence
of growth rate of the treated observation (devaluer) with respect to the nearest neighbors. I use
a single nearest neighbor without replacement and ¯ve nearest neighbors with replacement.
If we allow for replacement in the single nearest neighbor estimator, we are left with too
few comparison observations and the results are more di±cult to trust. On the other hand,
if no replacement is allowed for the ¯ve nearest neighbors, too many observations are used
approaching the results of unconditional comparison.
The results of the nearest neighbor without replacement show that devaluations do not have
any discernable e®ect on per capita output growth. Similarly, not even one of the estimates
coming from ¯ve nearest neighbors with replacement, which increases considerably the number
of control observations, is signi¯cantly di®erent from zero; neither is the mean e®ects nor the
median e®ects.
If we take the point estimates at face value, they range from 0.7 to -0.9 for the means and
from 1.1 to -0.2 for the medians. In other words, both mean and median e®ects do not even
present a systematic sign. The median e®ects, if anything, point more in the direction of an
expansionary e®ect. Nevertheless, from these results we can conclude that it is far-fetched to
say that devaluations have any systematic e®ect on output growth.
17Robustness
The Matching Estimator
First, I look at the nearest neighbor with replacement. The results are reported in Table
VII. As one can see, the number of control observations drops. The results show that the
mean e®ect is not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero in most cases. The exception is equation
4, where the mean e®ect is positive, but only marginally signi¯cant. The median of the
di®erence in per capita growth is positive in four of the ¯ve estimates, and two of them turn
out to be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero. This estimator clearly points to a positive e®ect of
devaluations on output. Nevertheless, these results should be taken carefully because of the
small number of control observations.
On the other hand, if the ¯ve nearest neighbors without replacement estimator is used, the
number of control observations increases considerably, approaching the whole control sample.
That is the reason for the mean estimates to become negative and signi¯cant, corroborating
the need to control for selection bias. In any case, although negative, the median e®ects are
not statistically di®erent from zero.
A matching method I use to check the robustness of the results is the local linear regression
(LLR) matching estimator, proposed by Heckman et al. [1997]. LLR is a non-parametric
technique similar to traditional kernel regression, but Fan [1992, 1993] shows that it has some




k2C Kik(Pk ¡ Pi)2 ¡ Kik(Pk ¡ Pi)(
P




k2C Kik(Pk ¡ Pi)2 ¡ (
P
k2C Kik(Pk ¡ Pi))2 ; (8)
where Kij is a kernel weighting function and Pi is the value of the propensity score for obser-
vation i. An additional, but equivalent way to apply LLR is the following: for each treated
observation, we run a weighted least square regression of the outcomes on the di®erence of the
propensity score, where less weight is assigned to those observations that have a more di®erent
propensity score. Under the assumptions we have made, the resulting constant should be a
good estimate of the expected outcome of the treated if it had not received the treatment, i.e.
E(y1ijx;D = 0). The weights can be chosen using any standard kernel function and selecting








where a and b are parameters, j indexes untreated observations and i indexes treated observa-
tions. I choose a standard Gaussian weighting kernel, with an also standard Silverman's rule
of thumb bandwidth.
18Using this technique I obtain the results reported in Table VII in the \Local Linear Re-
gression" lines. These results con¯rm what we concluded above: on average, devaluations do
not have a statistically signi¯cant e®ect on per capita output growth. This is true for both
the means and the medians.
Heckman et al. [1997] suggest that exclusion restrictions can be used to improve the
e±ciency of the matching estimators. Given that Z in equation (2) does not include all the
variables in T in equation (1), Heckman et al. [1997] show that matching estimators can
be performed on the residuals of equation (1) rather than the per capita growth rate itself.
Assuming that h(²) is linear on T, I use the residuals from the ¯rst two equations presented in
Table V (that do not include regional or yearly dummies), but excluding the large-devaluation
dummy variable. I then perform matching estimator to get the e®ect of devaluation on the
residuals. The results are presented in Table VIII. In this case, if anything, we see some
evidence of devaluations being expansionary. Three of the four models used to generate the
propensity score show a positive and signi¯cative median e®ect in panel a of Table VIII
(corresponding to ¯ve nearest neighbors with replacement).
Re-De¯ning Devaluation
The de¯nition of devaluation used so far is to some extent arbitrary. It is important to analyze
whether the results are robust to some aspects of the de¯nition. First, I increase the standard
deviations needed to qualify as a devaluation from 2.5 to 3.0 in equation (5) and I also reduce
it to 2.0. Increasing the threshold to 3.0 standard deviations reduces the number of large
devaluation years from 264 to 224, while increasing this threshold to 2.0 increases the number
of events to 318. The mean di®erence in per capita growth reported in panel A of Table II
remains practically unchanged, with a -2.01 for the 2.0 standard deviations and -2.14 for the
case of 3.0 standard deviations. The e®ect according to the regression analysis changes, but
only marginally. For instance, the dummy e®ect reported on column (2) of Table III goes
from -0.019 to -0.017 for 2.0 standard deviations and to -0.024 for 3.0 standard deviations.
Finally, for the matching estimators, the results varying the threshold are reported in Table
IX, panels a and b. All the results are not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero, con¯rming the
previous results.
In addition, I follow a more traditional de¯nition of large devaluations, based only on the
percentage rate of change of the exchange rate. Edwards [1989] as well as Morley [1992] de¯ne
a large devaluation episode as an episode where the monthly devaluation is above 15%. The
disadvantage of this de¯nition, as pointed above, is that the absolute devaluation rate is likely
19to have very di®erent impacts depending on how volatile is the exchange rate in general. With
this de¯nition the number of devaluation episodes is reduced from 264 to 237, but the two
de¯nitions share only 183 episodes. Using the 15% threshold the unconditional comparison
shows devaluations to be more contractionary. The mean di®erence of per capita growth rates
goes from -2.11 to -3.35. The same, though in a less dramatic way, occurs for the regression
analysis, where the parameter in front of the dummy variable in model (2) of Table III goes
from -0.019 to -0.025. Finally, the results from matching estimators, reported in panel c of
Table IX, shows that the signs of mean and median e®ects are systematically negative, but
the di®erences are still not signi¯cantly di®erent from zero.
Other
I check the robustness of the results with respect to two additional modi¯cations. First, I
include investment rates everywhere in the analysis. In the regression analysis the investment
to GDP ratio comes out with a positive and signi¯cative parameter, as expected. The e®ect
on the parameter of the dummy variable is negligible. In particular, if the investment to GDP
ratio is included in equation 2 of Table III, the parameter of the dummy variable goes from
-0.0213 to -0.0209. On the other hand, if the investment to GDP ratio is included in the
probit equations the parameter is systematically positive (both contemporaneous and lagged),
implying that more investment is associated with a larger probability of devaluation. However,
the mean and median e®ects for the matching results reported in Table VI do not change in
any signi¯cant way. The reason to exclude this variable from our analysis is to avoid problems
of endogeneity.
Finally, I change the de¯nition of high in°ation used to obtain the large devaluation
episodes. Recall that high in°ation periods, with a window of six months before and af-
ter, were treated as a di®erent country in equation (5). Increasing the high in°ation de¯nition
from 100% to 150% reduces the number of monthly events from 885 to 835 and to 834 if high
in°ation is de¯ne as above 200%. Accordingly, the number of large devaluation years drops
from 264 to 253 and 250, respectively20.
The unconditional di®erence of means is almost unaltered when changing the in°ation
threshold: -2.00 with a threshold of 150% and -1.99 with a threshold of 200%, compared to
-2.11 with a threshold of 100%. Also the results from the regression analysis are practically
unaltered. Finally, the results from matching estimators show no change in sign and no relevant
change in the signi¯cance of the parameters.
20VI Conclusions
If devaluations are contractionary {as argued by a growing number of studies both empirical
and theoretical{ the policy implication is that countries, in general, should try to avoid those
events. Nevertheless, the empirical literature seldom asks what is the alternative to a nominal
devaluation when a real exchange accommodation is needed. Traditionally, this literature
compares the growth rates during devaluation to the growth rate of a control group. At most,
using regression analysis, that literature controls for the steady state growth rate and/or the
level of external and internal shocks. But, the control group has to be properly de¯ned in order
to answer the question at hand: are devaluations contractionary given the current conditions?
What would have been the growth rate of a particular country that devalued the nominal
exchange rate had it not devalued? In other words, the control group has to be properly
de¯ned to avoid selection bias.
In order to control for selection bias I use matching estimators. This technique builds an
appropriate control group based on the propensity score or the probability of a large devalua-
tion. Additionally, this is a semi-parametric technique that is robust to the speci¯cation of the
outcome equation. Without controlling for selection bias I ¯nd devaluations to be associated
with a growth rate that is 2 percentage points lower than otherwise predicted. This result is
consistent with other studies. However, after controlling for selection bias, the contractionary
e®ect of devaluation vanishes. I implement a number of variants of matching estimators. I
also show sensitivity analysis with respect to the control variables as well as the de¯nition of
devaluation. The results are robust: devaluations show no statistically signi¯cant e®ect on
output growth.
The above result opens a series of questions with respect to when to allow for sharp deval-
uations. According to many, Argentina should have devalued its exchange rate years before
it actually did in 2000. According to traditional empirical methods Argentina's per capita
GDP would have grown about 2 percentage points less than it actually did had it followed
this recommendation. The present paper puts a big question mark on this last result. Sharp
devaluations should not be seen as a bad thing that should be avoided even at a high price.
Even though mean and median e®ects, after controlling for a number of variables, are not
statistically di®erent from zero at standard levels of con¯dence, there is a need to look further
into the distribution of the e®ects and their interaction with other variables. For which coun-
tries under what circumstances are devaluations more likely to be expansionary rather than
contractionary? Is there a di®erence for countries that have di®erent kinds of exchange rate
21regimes? Those are open questions that need to be addressed and that are beyond the scope
of the present study.
22Appendix: Data Sources and Construction
² GDP PER CAPITA (GDP
POP ): GDP per capita in dollars of 1995. Obtained from the
2001 World Bank World Developing Indicators CD, code NY.GDP.PCAP.KD. This data
was complemented with: i) Penn World Tables (PWT) 6.0 real per capita GDP chain
method (1996 prices), and ii) GDP data in 1990 constant dollars obtained from the
United Nations Statistical Division divided by Population data that was obtained from
the US Department of Commerce. The implied rates of growth of these two additional
sources were used to complete the WDI dataset. This variable is also used to construct
the initial per capita GDP (explained below), the per capita growth rates (as logarithmic
di®erence), the growth rate of the industrialized countries (all OECD countries except
Korea and Mexico, GIND) and the output gap (as deviations from a trend obtained using
a standard HP ¯lter, GAP).
² NOMINAL EXCHANGE RATES: End of month exchange rates with respect to the US
are obtained from the 2001 IFS CD-ROM provided by the IMF.
² INITIAL PER CAPITA GDP (Log(GDP
POP )): Corresponds to the ¯ve years moving average
of the per capita GDP. For a given period t the moving average ranges from t¡5 to t¡9.
² LIFE EXPECTANCY (LIFE): Corresponds to the historical life expectancy at birth. In
other words, it indicates the number of years a newborn infant would live if prevailing
patterns of mortality at the time of its birth were to stay the same throughout its life.
Data provided by 2001 WDI CD-ROM. Missing data was ¯lled with linear inter and
extra-polation when possible.
² AVERAGE YEARS OF SCHOOLING (AYOS): Corresponds to the average year of
school attainment of male 25 and over at the secondary and higher levels as reported
by Barro and Lee [2000]. Missing data was ¯lled with linear inter and extra-polation
when possible.
² GOVERNMENT SPENDING (G): Obtained from WPT6.0 as the share of government
spending to GDP (constant prices). This data was complemented with data from the
2001 WDI on Government Expenditure to GDP ratio.
² INFLATION (¼): The annual rate of in°ation of consumer prices use obtained from the
2001 WDI CD-ROM and complemented with annual variations in the WPT6.0 consump-
tion price level. Monthly data was obtained from the IFS (annual data form the IFS and
the WDI are the same, but the WDI data set is more complete).
² BLACK MARKET PREMIUM (BLACKMP): Corresponds to the o±cial exchange rate
to parallel exchange rate ratio in the 2001 WDI CD, code PA.NUS.FCRF.XR. It measures
the premium people must pay, relative to the o±cial exchange rate, to exchange the
domestic currency for dollars in the black market.
² OPENNESS (OPEN): This variables corresponds to the WPT6.0 openness at current
prices, measured as the ratio of the sum of exports and imports to GDP. The data was
complemented with data from the WDI. Using this variable I also calculated the historical
trend (OPENHP) using a standard HP ¯lter.
² CIVIL WAR (CWAR): This is a dummy for years in which a country is undergoing a
civil war. The variable is obtained from Dolley and Sambanis [2000].
² TROPICAL: This is a dummy variable for tropical countries as classi¯ed by the world
bank in the Global Development Network Growth Database.
23² EXPORTERS OF PRIMARY PRODUCTS (PRIMARYX): A dummy variable that takes
the value of one for exporters of nonfuel primary products. This dummy is found in the
Global Development Network Growth Database.
² TERMS OF TRADE (TOT): Terms of trade (goods and services, 1995 = 100) from
the Global Development Finance (GDF), a World Bank publication. The data for the
logarithmic change in this variable was complemented with the logarithmic change in the
terms of trade reported by the IMF in the IFS 2001 CD.
² MONETARY SHOCK (MSHOCK): This is the residual from a Cagan type of demand
for money, estimated using a 20 year window rolling regression. For each country I run
Log(M2)t = ®0Log(GDP)t+®0¼t+Log(M2)t¡1 where M2 is money and quasi money in
current local currency from the 2001 WDI CD (code FM.LBL.MQMY.CN), GDP is the
per capita GDP de¯ned above multiplied by the total population and ¼ is the in°ation
rate as de¯ned above. The regression is run for the period 1960-1979 to generate the
residuals for the period 1970-1979. Then I move the window a period forward (1961-
1980) to generate the residual for the period 1980, and so forth. This series of residuals
is the monetary shock variable. The rolling window is used to smooth out changes in the
parameters.
² FINANCIAL FRAGILITY: Following Beck et al. [2000] I measure the robustness of
the ¯nancial sector using the (log of) credit by deposit money banks and other ¯nancial
institutions to the private sector divided by GDP. The credit to the private sector corre-
sponds to lines 22d and 42d in the IFS. The variable is instrumented using legal origin
as instruments. The legal origin can be found in the World Bank Global Development
Network Growth Database, also reported by La Porta et al. [2000].
² REGIONS: Regions were classi¯ed according to the World Bank classi¯cation. According
to the WB the globe is divided in 7 geographic regions: East Asia and Paci¯c, Europe
and Central Asia, Latin America and the Caribbee, Middle East and North Africa, North
America, South Asia, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Mexico was re-allocated from North
America to the Latin America and the Caribbee classi¯cation.
² INVESTMENT (INV): Gross domestic ¯xed investment to GDP ratio is obtained from
the WPT6.0 (calculated from constant price values).
² EXPORTS (X): Exports of goods and services in current US$ obtained from the WDI,
code BX.GSR.GNFS.CD.
² EXTERNAL DEBT (DEBT): Total external debt in current US$ obtained from the
WDI, code DT.DOD.DECT.CD. This variable was used to calculate both the debt to
exports ratio and the level of over-indebtedness (OVERDEBT). The latter corresponds
to deviation of the external debt to GDP ratio from its historical trend. The trend was
calculated using a standard HP ¯lter.
² REAL EXCHANGE RATE (RER): This index (1990 = 100) was constructed using an-
nual average exchange rates, reference country's CPI and domestic CPI. The exchange
rate data is described above. The CPIs were obtained from the WDI.
² REAL EXCHANGE RATE MISALIGNMENT (RERMIS): This is the deviation of the
real exchange rate from its trend. The trend was calculated using a standard HP ¯lter.
Following Goldfajn and Vald¶ es [1997] I calculated other more structural versions of the
equilibrium real exchange rate, but the results are practically unchanged. In light of that
I report the results using the simplest and more standard calculation, i.e. using the HP
¯lter.
24² REGIONAL CRISIS (DREG): Following Edwards [2001], and in order to control for
contagion e®ects, this variable counts for each country during each year the number of
large devaluations that occur in the same year and the same geographic region (excluding
the country of reference). Geographic regions are in accordance to the World Bank
de¯nition of region, as described above.
² REGIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS (REGFLOW): Corresponds to the yearly private capital
°ows to the region divided by the year's regional GDP. Net private capital °ows consist
of private debt and non-debt °ows. Private debt °ows include commercial bank lending,
bonds, and other private credits; non-debt private °ows are foreign direct investment
and portfolio equity investment. Data are in current U.S. dollars and is obtained from
the 2001 WDI CD-ROM, code BN.KLT.PRVT.CD.DT. GDP in current U.S. dollars is
obtained from the same source. The regions correspond to the World Bank regions as
described above.
25Notes
1See Diaz Alejandro [1965], Cooper [1971a], Krugman and Taylor [1978], van Wijnbergen [1986] for
early support to that view. For a survey of the arguments see Edwards [1986, 1989].
2This episodic approach has advantages and drawbacks discussed in detail in Edwards [1989].
3Edwards and Santaella [1993] apply a similar methodological approach to investigate the di®erences
between devaluations undertaken within the context of an IMF program and devaluations implemented
without formal IMF-sponsored program during the Bretton Woods period. The authors look at the
e®ects on the real exchange rate, the current account and net foreign assets.
4In studying the output e®ect of devaluations Cooper [1971b], Edwards [1989], Morley [1992] and
Barro [2001] concentrate on sharp devaluations indicators. All these authors have found devaluations
to be contractionary.
5See Heckman et al. [1997] and Blundell and Costa Dias [2000]. An application to labor economics
can be found in Blundell, R., A. Duncan and C. Meghir [1998]. Matching estimators have been previ-
ously applied in the context of international economics by Persson [2001] and Edwards and Magendzo
[2001].
6I use only currencies of developed countries as reference currencies. In a case such as Sri Lanka
that the reference currency is the Indian Rupee, and the reference currency of the Indian Rupee is the
US dollar, I take the reference currency of Sri Lanka to be the US dollar as well.
7See the Appendix for the de¯nition of geographical regions and other variables.
8Data sources are described in the Appendix.
9See Barro [1996], Caselli et al. [1996] and Beck et al. [1999].
10Di®erent empirical studies have di®erent results for education variables. As explained by Caselli et
al. [1996]: \di®erent models lead to di®erent predictions on the expected sign of the coe±cient on the
human capital variables". Barro [2001] found average year of school attainment of male 25 and over at
the secondary and higher levels to be only marginally signi¯cant.
11See Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] and Heckman et al. [1997].
12Some of these variables were found not to explain currency crises by Krueger et al. [2000].
13See Kaminsky and Reinhart [1999], Reagle and Salvatore [2000] and Kamin and Babson [1999].
14See also Krueger et al. [2000] for evidence on regional contagion.
15See Eichengreen et al. [1996]
16See Edwards [2001].
17Using the other equations yields similar results.
18The median growth rate of exports for devaluers is 1.7%, for the rest of the observations is 9.0%
and it goes down to 3.7% for the matching observations.
19This estimator improves on kernel regression in two ways: a) the bias of the LLR estimator does not
depend on the design density of the data (i.e. on the density f(P(x)); and b) the order of convergence
is the same at the boundary points as at the interior points. For details see Fan [1992, 1993].
20As we increase the threshold level of in°ation we get two opposing e®ects on the number of episodes.
First, some large devaluations coming from high in°ation periods will not be left out of the de¯nition.
Second, large but milder devaluations become now part of the normal period and are more likely to
qualify as large devaluations. The net e®ect can go either way.
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29Table I:
Large Devaluation Episodes
Country Years Country Years Country Years
Albania 92 97 Guatemala 86 89 Oman 86
Algeria 90 94 Guinea 86 Pakistan 72
Angola 91 Guinea-Bissau 83 87 91 96 Papua New Guinea 74 83 90 94 97
Argentina 70 75 82 89 Guyana 87 Paraguay 84 89
Armenia 93 97 Haiti 91 Peru 75 88 99
Azerbaijan 99 Honduras 90 Philippines 70 83 97
Bangladesh 75 Hungary 82 86 94 Poland 92
Barbados 72 75 India 91 Poland 98
Belarus 92 97 Indonesia 78 83 86 97 Romania 90 95
Belize 72 75 Iran, Islamic Rep. 93 Russian Federation 92 98
Benin 94 Jamaica 78 83 91 Rwanda 90 94
Bhutan 91 Jordan 88 Samoa 79 83 88
Bolivia 72 79 85 Kazakhstan 94 99 Sao Tome and P. 87 91 94
Botswana 71 75 82 89 96 Kenya 75 81 93 Senegal 94
Brazil 79 89 99 Korea, Rep. 74 80 97 Seychelles 72 75
Bulgaria 91 94 97 Kyrgyz Republic 93 Sierra Leone 83 89 95
Burkina Faso 94 Lao PDR 85 95 Slovak Republic 93
Burundi 76 83 86 91 97 Latvia 92 Solomon Islands 74 81 85 97
Cambodia 90 Lesotho 75 84 89 96 South Africa 75 84 89 96
Cameroon 94 Liberia 98 Sri Lanka 77 98
Cape Verde 89 Libya 93 Sudan 91 96
Chad 94 Lithuania 92 Suriname 94 99
Chile 71 82 85 Macedonia, FYR 97 Swaziland 75 84 89 96
China 75 85 89 94 Madagascar 82 94 Syria 88
Comoros 94 Malawi 85 92 97 Tanzania 92
Congo, Dem. Rep. 76 79 87 93 Malaysia 73 93 97 Thailand 81 84 97
Congo, Rep. 94 Maldives 87 Togo 94
Costa Rica 74 81 88 Mali 94 Tonga 83
Cote d'Ivoire 94 Mauritania 85 91 98 Trinidad and Tobago 85 88 93
Croatia 97 Mauritius 72 79 98 Tunisia 75 81 86 91 97
Czech Republic 97 Mexico 76 82 85 94 Turkey 70 78 84 91 94
Dominican Rep. 85 90 Moldova 92 Uganda 87
Ecuador 70 82 92 99 Mongolia 92 96 Ukraine 93 98
Egypt, Arab Rep. 79 89 Morocco 74 78 90 Uruguay 72 82
El Salvador 86 90 Mozambique 87 Vanuatu 85 89
Equatorial Guinea 94 Myanmar 91 Venezuela, RB 84 89 94
Ethiopia 92 Namibia 84 89 96 Vietnam 85
Fiji 72 87 98 Nepal 75 81 85 91 Yemen, Rep. 95
Gabon 94 Nicaragua 79 88 93 Zambia 85 92
Gambia, The 73 84 Niger 94 Zimbabwe 75 82 91 97
Georgia 98 Nigeria 86 92 99









Mean -0.77 1.34 -2.11
(-4.72)
Median 0.48 1.95 -1.47
(-3.98)
B. Latin American Countries
Obs 58 666
Countries 23 31
Mean -2.16 2.01 -4.18
(-6.41)





Mean -2.44 0.89 -3.34
(-4.34)
Median -0.66 1.71 -2.37
(-4.01)
*: Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
31Table III:
Regression Analysis: Random E®ects Estimation
Dependant Variable: ¢Log(GDP
POP )
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log(GDP
POP )initial -0.009 -0.01 -0.01 -0.011 -0.015 -0.013
(4.34)** (4.11)** (3.56)** (5.90)** (2.68)** (2.62)**
Log(LIFE) 0.065 0.081 0.054 0.086 0.053 0.111
(4.09)** (4.78)** (2.68)** (6.24)** (1.23) (3.88)**
Log(AYOS) 0.003 -0.001 0 0.006 0.006 0.010
(1.04) (0.41) (0.07) (2.07)* (0.52) (1.22)
G/Y -0.062 -0.060 -0.059 -0.049 -0.098 -0.053
(4.05)** (3.77)** (3.85)** (3.68)** (2.90)** (1.46)
¼ -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0 -0.002
(3.30)** (3.55)** (3.66)** (3.61)** (1.70) (3.06)**
BLACKMP -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 -0.003
(3.92)** (4.77)** (4.11)** (4.68)** (2.74)** (1.45)
OPEN 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.024 -0.006
(0.68) (0.29) (0.83) (0.46) (2.00)* (0.67)
CWAR -0.016 -0.019 -0.019 -0.013 -0.016 -0.021
(4.16)** (5.14)** (5.27)** (3.87)** (2.64)** (3.27)**
TROPICAL -0.010 -0.008 -0.011 -0.007 -0.016 0.001
(2.96)** (2.07)* (2.38)* (2.45)* (1.99)* (0.08)
PRIMARYX -0.012 -0.010 -0.009 -0.009 -0.01 -0.005
(3.74)** (2.62)** (2.41)* (3.23)** (1.65) (0.70)
¢Log(TOT) 0.018 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.017 -0.014
(2.00)* (0.55) (0.42) (0.33) (1.28) (0.79)
GIND 0.011 -0.003 -0.001 || -0.067 -0.008
(0.36) (0.12) (0.02) (1.53) (0.29)
GAP¡1 || -0.462 -0.463 -0.468 -0.419 -0.408
(17.47)** (17.54)** (17.23)** (10.16)** (7.14)**
MSHOCK || -0.006 -0.009 -0.003 0.018 0.016
(0.43) (0.65) (0.23) (0.94) (0.79)
FINAN || 0.094 0.062 0.080 0.188 0.139
(3.07)** (1.80) (3.45)** (1.54) (2.52)*
D -0.023 -0.019 -0.020 -0.016 -0.031 -0.021
(5.19)** (4.90)** (5.14)** (3.94)** (4.98)** (3.55)**
Constant -0.156 -0.241 -0.122 -0.293 -0.090 -0.380
(2.66)** (3.67)** (1.56) (5.36)** (0.54) (3.40)**
Yearly Dummies No No No Yes No No
Regional Dummies No No Yes No No No
Observations 1358 1317 1317 1317 461 415
Number of Countries 74 72 72 72 21 72
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
32Table IV: Treated Countries and Nearest Neighbors
Nearest Neighbor Nearest Neighbor
Tread Country With Replacement Without Replacement
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Algeria 1990 Kenya 1980 Kenya 1980
Algeria 1994 Madagascar 1991 Benin 1981
Argentina 1982 Mozambique 1994 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1988
Argentina 1989 El Salvador 1985 El Salvador 1985
Bangladesh 1975 Lesotho 1992 Lesotho 1992
Benin 1994 Mozambique 1986 Chad 1979
Bolivia 1979 Kenya 1978 Kenya 1978
Bolivia 1985 Ghana 1994 Mali 1993
Botswana 1982 Central African Republic 1992 Central African Republic 1992
Botswana 1989 Ethiopia 1985 Ethiopia 1985
Botswana 1996 Costa Rica 1991 Costa Rica 1991
Brazil 1979 Mauritania 1984 Kenya 1991
Brazil 1989 Nigeria 1989 Nigeria 1989
Burkina Faso 1994 Ukraine 1997 Mozambique 1994
Burundi 1991 Cote d'Ivoire 1989 Cote d'Ivoire 1989
Burundi 1997 Cote d'Ivoire 1982 Cote d'Ivoire 1982
Cameroon 1994 Zambia 1998 Zambia 1998
Central African Republic 1994 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1988 Mozambique 1986
Chad 1994 Guinea 1998 Rwanda 1993
Chile 1982 Benin 1981 Benin 1981
Chile 1985 Bolivia 1984 Benin 1993
China 1985 Pakistan 1976 Pakistan 1976
China 1989 India 1997 India 1997
China 1994 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1996 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1996
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1976 Cameroon 1997 Cameroon 1997
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1979 Gabon 1985 Korea, Rep. 1985
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1987 Syrian Arab Republic 1994 Syrian Arab Republic 1994
Congo, Dem. Rep. 1993 Malaysia 1978 Malaysia 1978
Congo, Rep. 1994 Burkina Faso 1992 Ghana 1982
Costa Rica 1981 Argentina 1981 Ukraine 1997
Costa Rica 1988 Ghana 1992 Ghana 1992
Cote d'Ivoire 1994 Mozambique 1998 Ghana 1982
Czech Republic 1997 Mauritius 1989 Mauritius 1989
Dominican Republic 1985 Ghana 1982 Ukraine 1997
Dominican Republic 1990 Papua New Guinea 1982 Togo 1982
Ecuador 1982 Lesotho 1981 Lesotho 1981
Ecuador 1992 Senegal 1982 Senegal 1982
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1979 Yemen, Rep. 1994 Gambia, The 1981
Egypt, Arab Rep. 1989 Ethiopia 1991 Zambia 1998
El Salvador 1986 Gabon 1987 Gabon 1987
El Salvador 1990 Cameroon 1989 Cameroon 1989
Ethiopia 1992 Haiti 1987 Ghana 1982
Gabon 1994 Zambia 1983 Rwanda 1993
Gambia, The 1984 Benin 1993 Benin 1993
Ghana 1978 Senegal 1998 Senegal 1998
Ghana 1983 Lebanon 1991 Argentina 1981
Guatemala 1986 Ethiopia 1997 Ethiopia 1997
Guatemala 1989 Nepal 1980 Nepal 1980
Guinea-Bissau 1987 Rwanda 1989 Ghana 1982
Guinea-Bissau 1991 Panama 1990 Panama 1990
Guinea-Bissau 1996 Central African Republic 1989 Central African Republic 1989
33Table IV: Treated Countries and Nearest Neighbors
Nearest Neighbor Nearest Neighbor
Tread Country With Replacement Without Replacement
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Haiti 1991 Argentina 1987 Central African Republic 1991
Honduras 1990 Zambia 1991 Ukraine 1997
Hungary 1986 Turkey 1997 Turkey 1997
Hungary 1994 Nepal 1979 Nepal 1979
India 1991 Ethiopia 1988 Syrian Arab Republic 1983
Indonesia 1983 Cote d'Ivoire 1992 Cote d'Ivoire 1992
Indonesia 1986 Benin 1987 Benin 1987
Indonesia 1997 Cameroon 1988 Cameroon 1988
Jamaica 1978 Jordan 1978 Jordan 1978
Jamaica 1983 Sri Lanka 1996 Sri Lanka 1996
Jamaica 1991 Burkina Faso 1998 Burkina Faso 1998
Jordan 1988 Centralal African Republic 1985 Centralal African Republic 1985
Kenya 1981 Rwanda 1983 Rwanda 1983
Kenya 1993 Chad 1993 Ukraine 1997
Korea, Rep. 1980 Congo, Rep. 1993 Congo, Rep. 1993
Korea, Rep. 1997 Romania 1987 Romania 1987
Lesotho 1984 Central African Republic 1993 Central African Republic 1993
Lesotho 1989 Nepal 1974 Nepal 1974
Lesotho 1996 Tanzania 1997 Tanzania 1997
Madagascar 1982 Botswana 1992 Botswana 1992
Madagascar 1994 Guinea 1997 Guinea 1997
Malawi 1985 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1992 Congo, Dem. Rep. 1992
Malawi 1992 Sierra Leone 1994 Sierra Leone 1994
Malawi 1997 Bolivia 1988 Bolivia 1988
Malaysia 1993 Panama 1996 Panama 1996
Malaysia 1997 Benin 1991 Benin 1991
Mali 1994 Benin 1989 Ghana 1982
Mauritania 1985 Gambia, The 1981 Mozambique 1995
Mauritania 1991 Trinidad and Tobago 1984 Trinidad and Tobago 1984
Mauritania 1998 Bolivia 1982 Bolivia 1982
Mauritius 1979 Madagascar 1992 Madagascar 1992
Mauritius 1998 Korea, Rep. 1984 Korea, Rep. 1984
Mexico 1982 Rwanda 1981 Rwanda 1981
Mexico 1985 Malaysia 1983 Malaysia 1983
Mexico 1994 Uruguay 1981 Uruguay 1981
Morocco 1978 India 1987 India 1987
Morocco 1990 Dominican Republic 1984 Dominican Republic 1984
Mozambique 1987 Ethiopia 1986 Ghana 1982
Nepal 1975 Burundi 1989 Burundi 1989
Nepal 1981 Mauritania 1983 Mauritania 1983
Nepal 1985 Trinidad and Tobago 1982 Trinidad and Tobago 1982
Nepal 1991 Syrian Arab Republic 1996 Syrian Arab Republic 1996
Nicaragua 1979 Niger 1989 Niger 1989
Nicaragua 1988 Zambia 1984 Ghana 1982
Nicaragua 1993 Central African Republic 1991 Central African Republic 1991
Niger 1994 Syrian Arab Republic 1987 Egypt, Arab Rep. 1988
Nigeria 1986 Nicaragua 1991 Argentina 1981
Nigeria 1992 Niger 1985 Niger 1985
Pakistan 1972 Mali 1989 Mali 1989
Papua New Guinea 1983 Senegal 1993 Senegal 1993
Papua New Guinea 1990 Korea, Rep. 1985 Korea, Rep. 1985
34Table IV: Treated Countries and Nearest Neighbors
Nearest Neighbor Nearest Neighbor
Tread Country With Replacement Without Replacement
Country Year Country Year Country Year
Papua New Guinea 1994 Dominican Republic 1974 Dominican Republic 1974
Papua New Guinea 1997 Congo, Rep. 1987 Romania 1987
Paraguay 1984 Kenya 1991 Kenya 1991
Paraguay 1989 Togo 1984 Togo 1984
Peru 1988 Algeria 1987 Ghana 1982
Philippines 1983 Burkina Faso 1993 Burkina Faso 1993
Philippines 1997 Syrian Arab Republic 1983 Syrian Arab Republic 1983
Poland 1992 Pakistan 1997 Pakistan 1997
Poland 1998 Uruguay 1997 Uruguay 1997
Romania 1990 Chad 1979 Chad 1979
Romania 1995 Korea, Rep. 1994 Korea, Rep. 1994
Rwanda 1990 Lebanon 1998 Lebanon 1998
Rwanda 1994 Togo 1978 Ghana 1982
Senegal 1994 Haiti 1990 Ukraine 1997
Sierra Leone 1983 Senegal 1977 Senegal 1977
Sierra Leone 1989 Mozambique 1995 Mozambique 1995
Sierra Leone 1995 Guatemala 1982 Guatemala 1982
South Africa 1996 Brazil 1983 Brazil 1983
Sri Lanka 1977 Philippines 1979 Philippines 1979
Sri Lanka 1998 Dominican Republic 1976 Dominican Republic 1976
Syrian Arab Republic 1988 Burundi 1994 Ghana 1982
Tanzania 1992 Gabon 1992 Gabon 1992
Thailand 1981 Chad 1981 Chad 1981
Thailand 1984 Korea, Rep. 1979 Korea, Rep. 1979
Thailand 1997 Chad 1992 Chad 1992
Togo 1994 Rwanda 1993 Rwanda 1993
Trinidad and Tobago 1985 Peru 1982 Peru 1982
Trinidad and Tobago 1988 Seychelles 1998 Seychelles 1998
Trinidad and Tobago 1993 Mauritania 1989 Mauritania 1989
Tunisia 1981 Gambia, The 1991 Gambia, The 1991
Tunisia 1986 Cote d'Ivoire 1986 Cote d'Ivoire 1986
Tunisia 1991 Colombia 1990 Colombia 1990
Tunisia 1997 Barbados 1990 Barbados 1990
Turkey 1978 Peru 1983 Peru 1983
Turkey 1984 India 1974 India 1974
Turkey 1991 Peru 1985 Peru 1985
Turkey 1994 Togo 1982 Togo 1982
Uganda 1987 Benin 1997 Benin 1997
Ukraine 1998 Zambia 1990 Ghana 1982
Uruguay 1982 Syrian Arab Republic 1997 Syrian Arab Republic 1997
Venezuela 1984 Chad 1989 Ghana 1994
Venezuela 1989 Mali 1993 Mali 1989
Venezuela 1994 Cameroon 1978 Cameroon 1978
Yemen, Rep. 1995 Cote d'Ivoire 1981 Ghana 1982
Zambia 1985 Rwanda 1988 Rwanda 1988
Zambia 1992 Algeria 1989 Algeria 1989
Zimbabwe 1982 Gambia, The 1993 Gambia, The 1993
Zimbabwe 1991 Guinea 1995 Gabon 1992
Zimbabwe 1997 Algeria 1979 Algeria 1979
35Table V:
Propensity Scores: Random E®ects Probit Estimation
Dependant Variable: Large Devaluation Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4)
¢Log(X)¡1 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018
(4.47)** (4.44)** (4.58)** (3.90)**
(DEBT
X )¡1 0.025 0.030 0.045 0.043
(1.27) (1.47) (2.39)* (1.96)*
OVERDEBT 1.435 1.611 1.389 1.458
(3.38)** (3.66)** (3.42)** (3.24)**
Log(RER) 0.792 0.796 0.687 0.813
(4.68)** (4.63)** (4.25)** (4.00)**
RERMIS 4.283 4.373 4.190 4.726
(8.51)** (8.63)** (8.56)** (8.46)**
BLACKMP 0.125 0.122 0.122 0.103
(2.56)* (2.44)* (2.57)* (1.91)
OPEN 0.030 0.030 0.032 0.036
(3.26)** (3.20)** (3.47)** (3.49)**
OPENHP -0.031 -0.031 -0.032 -0.036
(3.20)** (3.12)** (3.34)** (3.27)**
DREG 0.042 0.046 0.060 0.002
(2.57)* (2.74)** (3.42)** (0.10)
REGFLOW -14.075 -17.286 -18.055 -18.579
(2.55)* (3.01)** (2.94)** (2.51)*
GAP¡1 3.334 4.473 5.236
(1.96)* (3.30)** (3.55)**
Constant -5.245 -5.271 -3.835 -10.423
(6.33)** (6.27)** (4.36)** (8.52)
Yearly Dummies No No No Yes
Regional Dummies No No Yes No
Observations 1269 1263 1263 1263
Number of countries 91 91 91 91
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses
* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
36Table VI:
Matching Estimators: E®ect of Large Devaluation on Per Capita Growth
N0 of Replace-
neighbors ment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls 151 151 151 151
Mean -0.60 0.17 -0.92 0.02
1 No (-0.74) (0.24) (-1.34) (0.02)
Median -0.21 1.11 -0.20 0.55
(-0.29) (1.83) (-0.28) (0.99)
Controls 414 410 361 377
Mean -0.61 -0.44 0.04 0.68
5 Yes (-0.99) (-0.73) (0.06) (1.12)
Median 0.39 0.20 0.38 0.80
(0.65) (0.39) (0.53) (1.78)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
37Table VII:
More Matching Estimators: E®ect of Large Devaluation on Per Capita Growth
N0 of Replace-
neighbors ment (1) (2) (3) (4)
Controls 118 118 109 110
Mean -0.85 1.04 0.22 1.55
1 Yes (-1.12) (1.39) (0.29) (2.05)
Median -1.06 1.23 0.18 1.29
(-1.46) (2.82) (0.23) (2.33)
Controls 755 755 755 755
Mean -1.60 -1.50 -1.67 -1.54
5 No (-2.53) (-2.40) (-2.72) (-2.44)
Median -0.95 -0.09 -0.54 -0.77
(-2.10) (-0.29) (-1.27) (-1.30)
Controls 1,128 1,125 1,125 1,125
weighted weighted weighted weighted
Local Linear Mean -0.39 0.31 0.44 0.15
Regression (-0.83) (0.66) (0.91) (0.32)
Median 0.32 0.76 0.88 0.54
(0.69) (1.90) (1.53) (1.06)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
38Table VIII:
Matching Estimators Using Exclusion Restrictions
N0 of Replace-
neighbors ment (1) (2) (3) (4)
a. Residuals from equation 1 in Table III
Controls 122 122 122 122
Mean 0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.001
1 Yes (0.523) (0.559) (0.274) (-0.272)
Median 0.002 0.005 0.002 -0.002
(0.483) (1.624) (0.636) (-0.817)
Controls 338 320 286 293
Mean 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002
5 No (0.338) (0.337) (0.587) (0.558)
Median 0.003 0.005 0.005 0.007
(0.836) (2.708) (2.179) (2.612)
b. Residuals from equation 2 in Table III
Controls 120 120 120 120
Mean -0.002 0.003 0 -0.002
1 Yes (-0.377) (0.755) (0.081) (-0.475)
Median 0.002 0.002 0.005 -0.003
(0.452) (0.600) (1.162) (-1)
Controls 337 319 282 293
Mean -0.003 0.001 0.001 0.000
5 No (-0.820) (0.285) (0.222) (-0.024)
Median -0.001 0.002 0.003 0.003
(-0.406) (0.421) (0.647) (1.032)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
39Table IX:
Changing the De¯nition of Devaluation
N0 of Replace-
neighbors ment (1) (2) (3) (4)
a. 3.0 Standard deviations in equation 5
Controls 136 136 136 136
Mean -0.006 0 -0.005 -0.004
1 Yes (-0.730) (-0.041) (-0.764) (-0.525)
Median -0.005 -0.006 -0.009 0.000
(-0.830) (-0.787) (-1.126) (-0.004)
Controls 359 347 314 329
Mean -0.009 0.007 0.001 0.004
5 No (-1.367) (1.063) (0.221) (0.668)
Median 0.001 0.007 0.007 0.006
(0.196) (1.201) (1.192) (1.159)
b. 2.0 Standard deviations in equation 5
Controls 174 174 174 174
Mean -0.002 -0.001 0.002 -0.001
1 Yes (-0.239) (-0.134) (0.224) (-0.082)
Median 0.003 0 0.003 -0.004
(0.346) (0.066) (0.384) (-0.629)
Controls 427 446 444 392
Mean -0.005 0.003 0.000 0.004
5 No (-0.830) (0.500) (0.059) (0.759)
Median 0.005 0.004 0.008 0.007
(0.769) (0.746) (2.054) (1.132)
c. Devaluations over 15%
Controls 147 147 147 147
Mean -0.013 -0.010 -0.010 -0.010
1 Yes (-1.726) (-1.377) (-1.240) (-1.257)
Median -0.008 -0.002 -0.012 -0.006
(-0.859) (-0.190) (-1.434) (-0.732)
Controls 347 337 289 311
Mean -0.016 -0.006 -0.004 -0.003
5 No (-2.504) (-0.907) (-0.670) (-0.437)
Median -0.011 -0.002 0.002 0.001
(-2.360) (-0.240) (0.422) (0.200)
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics
* signi¯cant at 5%; ** signi¯cant at 1%
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